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R. v. Conway: UnChartered Territory 
for Administrative Tribunals 
Christopher D. Bredt and Ewa Krajewska* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In R. v. Conway1 the Supreme Court of Canada reformulated and 
simplified the test for when an administrative tribunal is considered a 
court of competent jurisdiction to consider constitutional questions and 
order Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms2 remedies. In doing so, 
the Supreme Court has simplified the law in this area by making the 
primary consideration whether the administrative tribunal can consider 
questions of law.  
In the second part of this paper, we review the law on the jurisdiction 
of administrative tribunals to consider the Charter as it stood prior to 
Conway. In the third and fourth parts, we outline the judicial history of 
Conway, the new test that the Supreme Court has set out and the possible 
implications of the decision. Finally, we consider the jurisprudence since 
Conway to see how the decision is being applied.  
II.  THE LAW PRIOR TO CONWAY 
Prior to Conway, different tests were applied to determine whether a 
tribunal had jurisdiction under section 52 of the Constitution Act3 and 
section 24(1) of the Charter. Thus, the analysis that was followed in 
determining whether a tribunal had jurisdiction to apply the Charter 
depended on the nature of the Charter question at issue:  
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1  [2010] S.C.J. No. 22, 2010 SCC 22 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Conway”]. 
2  Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 
1982, c. 11. 
3  Id. 
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(1) If an applicant submitted that the tribunal should find a legislative 
provision constitutionally invalid or inapplicable, then the analysis 
under section 52 applied.  
(2) If an applicant requested that the tribunal provide a personal remedy 
on the basis that his or her Charter rights had been infringed, then 
the analysis under section 24(1) applied.  
However, as the jurisprudence developed, the two tests began to 
overlap. In particular, the test for jurisdiction under section 24(1) came to 
incorporate many of the same factors that were considered under the test 
for jurisdiction under section 52. Accordingly, it was rare for a tribunal to 
have jurisdiction to grant a remedy for a Charter violation under section 
24(1), if it did not also have jurisdiction to consider the constitutional 
validity of a legislative provision under section 52. 
In the next two sections, we discuss the different tests that were ap-
plied under section 52 and section 24, prior to the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Conway.  
1. The Test under Section 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982 
Because administrative tribunals are not courts within the meaning of 
section 96 of the Constitution Act, 1867,4 they have no jurisdiction to 
issue declarations of invalidity. However, they are still able to consider 
the constitutional validity of legislative provisions, albeit without the 
power to declare them invalid. If an administrative tribunal finds a law 
invalid, it would decline to apply it. The question of when an administra-
tive tribunal has jurisdiction to consider the constitutional validity of a 
legislative provision was established by the Supreme Court of Canada in 
Cuddy Chicks Ltd. v. Ontario (Labour Relations Board)5 and further 
clarified in Nova Scotia (Workers’ Compensation Board) v. Martin.6 
Writing for the majority, Gonthier J.’s analysis was based upon the 
following considerations:  
(1)  The invalidity of a legislative provision arises from the operation of 
section 52 itself, not from a declaration of invalidity by a court. Ac-
cordingly, a tribunal with the power to interpret laws also has the 
power to determine whether they are constitutionally valid. 
                                                                                                             
4  (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No. 5. 
5  [1991] S.C.J. No. 42, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 5 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Cuddy Chicks”]. 
6  [2003] S.C.J. No. 54, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 504 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Martin”]. 
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(2)  Canadians should be able to assert their Charter rights in the most 
accessible forum available, without resorting to parallel court pro-
ceedings. 
(3)  A court that subsequently reviews a tribunal’s decision will benefit 
greatly from the informed view of the tribunal as to the relevant 
facts and policy concerns engaged in a particular regulatory context. 
(4)  A determination by an administrative tribunal that a legislative 
provision infringes the Charter will be subject to judicial review on 
a standard of correctness. As such, the constitutional principle of the 
separation of powers is preserved. 
(5)  Finally, administrative tribunals possess no power to issue a declara-
tion of invalidity, and accordingly their decisions as to constitutional 
validity will not bind future decision-makers. However, an adminis-
trative tribunal that has jurisdiction to find a law constitutionally in-
valid will, on that basis, decline to apply it. 
The Martin test to determine whether a tribunal had jurisdiction to 
determine the constitutional validity of legislation was as follows: 
(1) Does the administrative tribunal have jurisdiction, explicit or 
implied, to decide questions of law? The power to decide a question 
of law is the power to decide by applying only valid laws. 
• Explicit jurisdiction is that found in the terms of the statutory 
grant of authority.  
• Jurisdiction can also be implied by looking at the statute as a 
whole, including:  
(a) the statutory mandate of the tribunal in issue, and whether 
deciding questions of law is necessary to fulfil this 
mandate effectively; 
(b) the interaction of the tribunal in question with other ele-
ments of the administrative system; 
(c) whether the tribunal is adjudicative in nature; and 
(d) practical considerations, including the tribunal’s capacity 
to consider questions of law. 
If the answer to this question is in the affirmative, this raises a pre-
sumption that the tribunal has jurisdiction. 
(2) Has the presumption been rebutted?  
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• The presumption that a tribunal with authority to consider 
questions of law has jurisdiction to consider constitutional va-
lidity may be rebutted by:  
(a)  an explicit withdrawal of authority to consider the Charter; 
or  
(b)  showing that an examination of the statutory scheme itself 
clearly leads to the conclusion that the legislature intended 
to exclude the Charter (or a category of questions that 
would include the Charter, such as constitutional questions 
generally) from the scope of the questions of law to be ad-
dressed by the tribunal.  
Subsequent decisions have added additional elements to this test. For 
example, even if a tribunal did not have jurisdiction under section 52, it 
could apply “Charter values” to assist it in applying ambiguous legisla-
tive provisions. That is, if a legislative provision was open to more than 
one interpretation, but one interpretation would be inconsistent with the 
Charter, the tribunal would prefer the interpretation that is consistent 
with the Charter.7 
2. The Test under Section 24(1) of the Charter 
Section 24(1) permits a “court of competent jurisdiction” to grant a 
remedy to someone whose Charter rights have been infringed. It serves 
to remedy unconstitutional government acts, as opposed to unconstitu-
tional laws. 
The test under section 24 was primarily developed in the criminal 
law context. The first case to consider the phrase “court of competent 
jurisdiction” in the context of section 24 was R. v. Mills.8 In Mills, the 
Supreme Court held that a preliminary inquiry judge was not a court of 
competent jurisdiction for the purposes of issuing the remedy of a stay 
under section 24(1) of the Charter in circumstances where there was an 
alleged breach of the accused’s right to be tried within a reasonable time 
as guaranteed by section 11(b). The three-pronged Mills test was articu-
                                                                                                             
7  Criminal Lawyers’ Assn. v. Ontario (Ministry of Public Safety and Security), [2004] O.J. 
No. 1214, 13 Admin. L.R. (4th) 26 (Ont. Div. Ct.) [hereinafter “Criminal Lawyers’ Assn.”], revd on 
other grounds [2007] O.J. No. 2038, 280 D.L.R. (4th) 193 (Ont. C.A.), revd on other grounds [2010] 
S.C.J. No. 23, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 815 (S.C.C.). 
8  [1986] S.C.J. No. 39, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 863 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Mills”]. 
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lated by McIntyre J., who stated that a court of competent jurisdiction 
must possess:  
(1) jurisdiction over the person; 
(2) jurisdiction over the subject matter; and 
(3) jurisdiction to grant the remedy. 
In Weber v. Ontario Hydro,9 the Supreme Court held that the Mills 
test should also be applied to administrative tribunals. A majority of the 
Court held that an administrative tribunal does have the power to grant 
Charter remedies like damages if the statute gives it the authority to grant 
that kind of remedy. The dissent held that while labour arbitrators may 
not apply provisions that violate the Charter, they are not courts of 
competent jurisdiction and cannot provide Charter remedies under 
section 24 of the Charter.  
The diversity of views on the application of the Mills analysis con-
tinued in subsequent decisions. For example, in Mooring v. Canada 
(National Parole Board),10 the Court was divided as to whether the 
National Parole Board was a court of competent jurisdiction for the 
purposes of excluding evidence under section 24(2). The majority of the 
Court, in a decision written by Sopinka J., determined that the functions 
and structures of the Board were neither judicial nor quasi-judicial, and 
thus the Board was not a court of competent jurisdiction.  
Subsequently, in the 2001 Dunedin11 decision written by McLachlin 
C.J.C., the Court added a functional and structural analysis to the third 
branch of the Mills test, which considered whether a tribunal has jurisdic-
tion to grant a particular remedy. This part of the test is discussed in more 
detail below.  
Although the Mills test had three parts, as will be seen, the third part 
of the test was determinative in each case. Each aspect of the Mills test is 
discussed in further detail below. 
(a) Jurisdiction over the Person  
The first part of the Mills test was uncontroversial, as it had been 
admitted in all of the leading cases. 
                                                                                                             
9  [1995] S.C.J. No. 59, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 929 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Weber”]. 
10  [1996] S.C.J. No. 10, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 75 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Mooring”]. 
11  R. v. 974649 Ontario Inc., [2001] S.C.J. No. 79, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 575 (S.C.C.) [hereinaf-
ter “Dunedin”]. 
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(b) Jurisdiction over the Subject Matter 
The Supreme Court did not expressly articulate the applicable test 
for subject matter jurisdiction under section 24(1). This requirement was 
conceded in Dunedin and Hynes12 and assumed in Mooring. The issue 
was briefly considered by McLachlin J., for the majority, in Weber, 
where it was held that as long as an alleged Charter breach or dispute 
arose from the collective agreement, a labour arbitrator would have the 
necessary subject matter jurisdiction.  
The Ontario Court of Appeal considered the definition of subject 
matter jurisdiction in obiter in Conway.13 The amicus curiae for Conway 
argued that subject matter jurisdiction existed as the allegations arose 
from and directly addressed the factual matters that fell squarely within 
the jurisdiction of the Ontario Review Board (“ORB”). On the other 
hand, counsel for the Centre for Addiction and Mental Health (“CAMH”) 
and the ORB cited the Martin decision for the general proposition that 
the ORB must have express or implied jurisdiction to decide questions of 
law, in order to have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the proceed-
ings. Essentially, this line of reasoning would have imported the Martin 
test for section 52 jurisdiction into the second prong of the Mills test. 
Neither the majority nor the minority at the Court of Appeal deter-
mined the case on the basis of subject matter jurisdiction, but both 
rejected the submissions by CAMH and the ORB that the test set out in 
Martin for section 52 jurisdiction applied to the question of subject 
matter jurisdiction under section 24(1). 
(c) Jurisdiction to Grant the Remedy: The Functional and Structural 
Approach 
This was the part of the Mills analysis that was usually determinative 
of the issue.  
In Dunedin, the Supreme Court stated that the issue of whether a tri-
bunal has the power to grant a particular section 24(1) remedy is deter-
mined by a “functional and structural analysis”. This means the function 
the legislature has asked the tribunal to perform and the powers and 
processes with which it has furnished it. Chief Justice McLachlin wrote:  
                                                                                                             
12  R. v. Hynes, [2001] S.C.J. No. 80, 2001 SCC 82, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 623 (S.C.C.) [hereinaf-
ter “Hynes”]. 
13  R. v. Conway, [2008] O.J. No. 1588, 2008 ONCA 326 (Ont. C.A.) [hereafter “Conway 
(C.A.)”]. 
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 Parliament and the provincial legislatures premise legislation on 
the fact that courts and tribunals operate within a legal system governed 
by the constitutional rights and norms entrenched by the Charter. The 
“functional and structural” approach reflects this premise. It rests on the 
theory that where Parliament or a legislature confers on a court or 
tribunal a function that engages Charter issues, and furnishes it with 
procedures and processes capable of fairly and justly resolving these 
incidental Charter issues, then it must be presumed that the legislature 
intended the court or tribunal to exercise this power.14 
Two sources may provide guidance in determining the function and 
structure of a court or tribunal: the language of the enabling legislation 
and the history and accepted practice of the institution.  
It must be noted that the functional and structural analysis seeks to 
identify whether the tribunal has jurisdiction over the Charter remedy in 
issue, as opposed to simply the remedy in the generic sense. However, 
the functional and structural analysis moves beyond this question to also 
ask whether the legislature intended the tribunal to have the remedy at its 
disposal when confronted with Charter violations during the course of its 
proceedings.15 For example, even if a tribunal has jurisdiction to grant 
damages in the ordinary course, if a complainant seeks damages as a 
Charter remedy, the appropriate question is whether the legislature 
intended the tribunal to be able to grant damages for a Charter violation. 
The functional and structural analysis was applied as follows:  
 The function of the court or tribunal is an expression of its purpose 
or mandate. As such, it must be assessed in relation to both the 
legislative scheme and the broader legal system. First, what is the court 
or tribunal’s function within the legislative scheme? Would jurisdiction 
to order the remedy sought under s. 24(1) frustrate or enhance this role? 
How essential is the power to grant the remedy sought to the effective 
and efficient functioning of the court or tribunal? Second, what is the 
function of the court or tribunal in the broader legal system? Is it more 
appropriate that a different forum redress the violation of Charter 
rights? 
 The inquiry into the structure of the court or tribunal relates to the 
compatibility of the institution and its processes with the remedy 
sought under s. 24. Depending on the particular remedy in issue, any or 
all of the following factors may be salient: whether the proceedings are 
judicial or quasi-judicial; the role of counsel; the applicability or 
                                                                                                             
14  Dunedin, supra, note 11, at para. 36. 
15  Id., at para. 35. 
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otherwise of traditional rules of proof and evidence; whether the court 
or tribunal can issue subpoenas; whether evidence is offered under 
oath; the expertise and training of the decision-maker; and the 
institutional experience of the court or tribunal with the remedy in 
question … Other relevant considerations may include the workload of 
the court or tribunal, the time constraints it operates under, its ability to 
compile an adequate record for a reviewing court, and other such 
operational factors. The question, in essence, is whether the legislature 
or Parliament has furnished the court or tribunal with the tools 
necessary to fashion the remedy sought under s. 24 in a just, fair and 
consistent manner without impeding its ability to perform its intended 
function.16  
Thus, prior to Conway, there were separate and relatively complex 
tests for section 52 and section 24 jurisdiction, with some overlap 
between the two tests.  
III.  THE NEW TEST UNDER CONWAY 
1. Judicial History 
In 1984, Paul Conway (“Conway”) was found not guilty by reason of 
insanity on a charge of sexual assault with a weapon. Since the verdict, 
he had been detained in hospital. The majority of that time he spent in the 
maximum-secure unit of the Penetanguishene Mental Health Centre. In 
2005, the ORB ordered that Conway be transferred to the medium-secure 
unit of CAMH.  
In the summer and fall of 2006, the ORB held its annual review of 
Conway’s detention. At that review, Conway asked the ORB to exercise its 
statutory powers to impose conditions on his detention at CAMH, and also 
applied for a section 24(1) Charter remedy as relief from alleged breaches 
of his rights. Specifically, Conway applied for an absolute discharge under 
section 24(1) of the Charter, claiming, in part, that the living and discipli-
nary conditions under which he was being detained infringed his rights 
under sections 2(b), 2(d), 7, 8, 9 and 15(1). The ORB declined to hear 
Conway’s Charter application on the basis that it was not a “court of 
competent jurisdiction” to provide relief under section 24(1). In the result, 
the ORB ordered that Conway continue to be detained at CAMH and made 
suggestions in regard to the conditions of his detention. 
                                                                                                             
16  Id., at paras. 44-45 (emphasis added). 
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Conway appealed on two grounds: that the ORB had erred by mak-
ing mere suggestions to CAMH regarding his detention, rather than 
imposing conditions; and that the ORB had erred in holding that it was 
not a “court of competent jurisdiction”.  
On the first ground, the Court of Appeal unanimously held that the 
ORB had erred by not fulfilling its obligation to impose conditions.  
On the second ground, the Court of Appeal disagreed about how to 
decide whether the ORB had jurisdiction over the remedy sought. Justice 
Armstrong, writing for the majority, characterized the ORB as not a 
traditional judicial tribunal, and therefore found that the ORB was not a 
court of competent jurisdiction with respect to the remedy sought by 
Conway, i.e., an absolute discharge. He noted specifically that:  
(1) proceedings are inquisitorial rather than adjudicative; 
(2) proceedings are non-adversarial; 
(3) none of the parties is fixed with the burden of proof; 
(4) traditional rules of evidence are relaxed; 
(5) evidence is generally not presented under oath; and 
(6) although the chair of the panel has legal training, the majority of 
panel members do not.17  
Justice Lang, in dissent, held that the nature of the remedy sought 
should not be construed in an “unduly narrow manner”.18 The simple 
fact that the particular remedy requested is not essential for the tribu-
nal’s functioning should not prevent a court from considering whether a 
related remedy does meet the requirement. She concluded that the 
Board could order conditions or make another appropriate order to 
remedy a breach of a patient’s Charter rights. A patient should not be 
compelled to make a separate application to the superior court relating 
to Charter breaches, when such breaches could be dealt with at a review 
hearing, as this would effectively deny the patient his or her rights.19 
Justice Lang also considered the function and structure of the Board, 
holding that it could provide an expeditious determination concerning 
any Charter breaches relating to Conway’s treatment, and that there was 
no evidence that limited section 24(1) jurisdiction would impede the 
Board’s efficiency. 
                                                                                                             
17  Conway (C.A.), supra, note 13, at para. 55, per Armstrong J.A. 
18  Id., at para. 94. 
19  Id., at para. 100. 
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Thus, the majority and minority in Conway differed in their applica-
tion of the factors in the functional and structural analysis. Also, the 
majority considered only the particular remedy sought by Conway, while 
the minority looked as well to whether the Board might have jurisdiction 
over another relevant remedy. Conway appealed the decision to the 
Supreme Court of Canada.  
2. The Supreme Court’s Decision 
Although the specific issue in Conway is the remedial jurisdiction of 
the ORB under section 24(1) of the Charter, the wider issue, as framed 
by Abella J., is the relationship between the Charter, its remedial provi-
sions and administrative tribunals. 
Before setting out the new test for determining whether an adminis-
trative tribunal can grant a Charter remedy, Abella J. conducted a 
thorough review of the history of jurisdiction of administrative tribunals. 
She described three important strands in this legal history. The first is the 
test in Mills, which has served as the grid for determining whether a 
court or administrative tribunal was a “court of competent jurisdiction” 
under section 24(1). The second strand started with Slaight Communica-
tions;20 its legacy is the conclusion that any exercise of statutory discre-
tion is subject to the Charter and Charter values. The third strand is the 
Cuddy Chicks trilogy,21 the effect of which is that specialized tribunals 
with both expertise and authority to decide questions of law are in the 
best position to hear and decide constitutional questions related to their 
statutory mandates. This third strand provided the underpinning for the 
test in Martin. 
After conducting this review of the evolution of the jurisprudence on 
the power of administrative tribunals to consider Charter issues, Abella J. 
set out the following test for whether an administrative tribunal can order 
a remedy under section 24(1) of the Charter:  
(1) Does the administrative tribunal have jurisdiction, explicit or 
implicit, to decide questions of law? If it does, and unless it is 
clearly demonstrated that the legislature intended to exclude the 
Charter from the tribunal’s jurisdiction, the tribunal is a court of 
                                                                                                             
20  Slaight Communications v. Davidson, [1989] S.C.J. No. 45, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1038 (S.C.C.). 
21  Cuddy Chicks, supra, note 5; Douglas/Kwantlen Faculty Assn. v. Douglas College, 
[1990] S.C.J. No. 124, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 570 (S.C.C.); Tétreault-Gadoury v. Canada (Employment 
and Immigration Commission), [1991] S.C.J. No. 41, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 22 (S.C.C.). 
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competent jurisdiction and can consider and apply the Charter — 
and Charter remedies — when resolving the matters properly be-
fore it.22 
(2) If the answer to the first question is affirmative, the remaining 
question is whether the tribunal can grant the particular remedy 
sought, given the relevant statutory scheme. At issue will be 
whether the remedy sought is the kind of remedy that the legislature 
intended to fit within the statutory framework of the tribunal. Rele-
vant considerations will include the tribunal’s statutory mandate, 
structure and function.23  
This overview of the test shows that the inquiry on the first part of 
the test is similar to the test set out in Martin as to whether the adminis-
trative tribunal is a court of competent jurisdiction for the purposes of 
section 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982. The second part of the inquiry is 
similar to the third part of the Mills analysis. In the result, the Court has 
merged the section 52 and section 24 tests into an institutional inquiry of 
whether the particular tribunal has the jurisdiction to consider questions 
of law, including Charter issues.  
3. Application of the New Test 
In considering whether the ORB is a court of competent jurisdiction, 
Abella J. highlighted the following aspects of the ORB’s structure and 
legislative mandate: 
• The Board is a quasi-judicial body.  
• It is authorized under Part XX.1 of the Criminal Code24 to decide 
questions of law. 
• It has supervisory jurisdiction over the treatment, assessment, 
detention and discharge of those accused who have been found not 
criminally responsible by reason of mental disorder.  
• There is a right of appeal from the Board’s disposition on any 
ground of appeal that raises a question of law, fact or mixed fact and 
law.  
 
                                                                                                             
22  Conway, supra, note 1, at para. 81.  
23  Id., at para. 82.  
24  R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. 
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In the second stage of the analysis, Abella J. phrased the issue as 
follows: 
 The question for this Court to decide … is whether the particular 
remedies sought by Mr. Conway are the kinds of remedies that 
Parliament appeared to have anticipated would fit within the statutory 
scheme governing the Ontario Review Board. This requires us to 
consider the scope and nature of the Board’s statutory mandate and 
functions.25  
When considering the ORB’s statutory mandate and functions, 
Abella J. discussed the dispositions available to the Board, the Board’s 
broad discretion to consider a large range of evidence in order to fulfil its 
mandate, and the significant expertise of the Board members. 
The remedies that Conway sought (an absolute discharge despite the 
conclusion that he remained a significant threat to public safety, or to 
direct CAMH to provide him with a particular treatment) were admit-
tedly outside of the Board’s statutory jurisdiction, but he asserted that 
section 24(1) of the Charter freed the Board from statutory limits on its 
jurisdiction. The Court expressly disagreed with this submission. Justice 
Abella held that the remedies sought by Conway would frustrate the 
Board’s mandate to supervise the special needs of those who are found to 
require the treatment/assessment regime and would be in clear contradic-
tion of Parliament’s intent.  
Lastly, and significantly, Abella J. indicated that tribunals can vindi-
cate claimants’ Charter rights by exercising their regular statutory powers 
and processes in ways that accord with Charter values. Justice Abella 
writes: 
Remedies granted to redress Charter wrongs are intended to 
meaningfully vindicate a claimant’s rights and freedoms. ... Yet, it is 
not the case that effective, vindicatory remedies for harm flowing from 
unconstitutional conduct are available only through separate and 
distinct Charter applications. ... Charter rights can be effectively 
vindicated through the exercise of statutory powers and processes. ... In 
this case, it may well be that the substance of Mr. Conways’ complaint 
about where his room is located can be fully addressed within the 
framework of the Board’s statutory mandate and the exercise of its 
discretion in accordance with Charter values.26 
                                                                                                             
25  Conway, supra, note 1, at para. 85 (emphasis added).  
26  Id., at para. 103. 
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IV.  IMPLICATIONS OF CONWAY 
There are five notable aspects of the Conway decision.  
1. Administrative Tribunals Should Play a Primary Role in 
Determining Charter Issues 
First, the overarching theme in Conway is the Court’s acceptance that 
administrative tribunals should play a primary role in determining 
Charter issues falling within their jurisdiction. The decision could be said 
to fall within a general trend affirming the power of administrative 
tribunals and respecting their decision-making (as seen in Dunsmuir,27 
Khosa,28 and Bell Canada).29 
2. The Primary Inquiry Is Whether the Tribunal Can Consider 
Questions of Law 
Under the Mills analysis, the inquiry into whether the tribunal has 
jurisdiction to issue a remedy was driven by the specific remedy that was 
sought. In freeing the analysis from the anchor of the remedy and re-
situating it on the institutional structure and mandate of the tribunal, the 
Court is implicitly condoning a more contextual approach. The most 
important inquiry will be whether the tribunal has the power to apply the 
law. The remedy sought will only be a secondary concern. The most 
important issue at the second stage will be whether this remedy is within 
the tribunal’s jurisdiction and does not frustrate its legislative mandate or 
structure. As indicated by Abella J., section 24(1) does not bestow on a 
tribunal remedies that are outside its legislative jurisdiction.  
3. Reliance on Charter Values in Lieu of Charter Rights 
Third, the Court made clear that a tribunal can provide an effective 
remedy against a Charter breach through the exercise of its discretion in 
accordance with Charter values. In a sense, the Court may have been 
indicating that a complainant or applicant is not required to demonstrate 
                                                                                                             
27  Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, [2008] S.C.J. No. 9, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190 (S.C.C.). 
28  Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v. Khosa, [2009] S.C.J. No. 12, [2009] 1 S.C.R. 
339 (S.C.C.). 
29  Bell Canada v. Bell Aliant Regional Communications, [2009] S.C.J. No. 40, [2009] 2 
S.C.R. 764 (S.C.C.). 
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a Charter breach in order to receive an appropriate remedy. The statute 
that the applicant is relying upon, interpreted in accordance with Charter 
values, may be sufficient to remedy a harm.  
4. Administrative Tribunals that Are Adjudicative in Nature 
Although overall the decision in Conway condones the power of ad-
ministrative tribunals to consider Charter issues, Abella J. relies on many 
of the traditional juridical aspects and court-like structure of the ORB to 
conclude that it has the jurisdiction to apply the Charter. For example, it 
is important for her that an appeal lies from the ORB’s determinations of 
questions of law, fact and mixed questions of law and fact. Thus adminis-
trative tribunals that are adjudicative in nature will continue to be 
regarded as better suited to address legal issues.  
5. Remedies Available to Administrative Tribunals 
Restricting Charter remedies to those that the tribunal would have 
the power to grant according to its constituting statute arguably privi-
leges that statute over the Charter. The Court’s reasoning suggests that 
the legislator has the power to deny Charter applicants meaningful 
remedies in the administrative process simply by excluding certain 
remedies from the tribunal’s jurisdiction. This decision may play into a 
developing ambivalence on the Court about Charter remedies: on one 
hand, sometimes a simple finding of a Charter breach is a sufficient 
remedy (e.g., Canada (Prime Minister) v. Khadr30); on the other, some-
times courts must award damages in order to vindicate Charter rights 
(e.g., Vancouver (City) v. Ward31). 
What is clear is that the Charter cannot fundamentally alter the func-
tion and structure of an administrative tribunal. The powers of an 
administrative tribunal are determined by its enabling statute and the 
Charter will not enhance these powers. The remedy sought is one that 
must be available to the administrative tribunal itself. 
On the whole, the Court’s decision in Conway provided much-
needed clarification of a test that had become complex and difficult to 
apply. We turn now to a consideration of how Conway has been applied.  
                                                                                                             
30  [2010] S.C.J. No. 3, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 44 (S.C.C.). 
31  [2010] S.C.J. No. 27, [2010] 2 S.C.R. 28 (S.C.C.). 
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V.  APPLICATION OF CONWAY 
1. Administrative Tribunals Jurisdiction to Consider Charter and 
Constitutional Issues 
(a) New Courts of Competent Jurisdiction 
As predicted, the test in Conway appears to have simplified the test 
for when an administrative tribunal is a court of competent jurisdiction. 
As is illustrated in Sazant v. College of Physicians and Surgeons,32 the 
primary question has now become whether the tribunal has the power to 
consider questions of law. The functional and structural analysis no 
longer figures prominently in the test.  
In Sazant, the appellant appealed to the Divisional Court from the 
final and interim decisions of the Discipline Committee of the College of 
Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario (the “Committee”). One of the 
appellant’s arguments was that section 76(1) of the Health Professions 
Procedural Code33 was unconstitutional and violated his section 7 and 
section 8 Charter rights. The appellant sought to have the Committee’s 
decisions overturned on a number of grounds, and challenged the 
Committee’s jurisdiction to consider the constitutional challenge.  
The Divisional Court relied on Conway to hold that the Committee 
did have jurisdiction to determine Charter issues. The Court asserted that 
Conway stood for the proposition that where an administrative tribunal 
had the power to decide questions of law, and the tribunal’s constitutional 
jurisdiction had not been withdrawn by statute, the tribunal could decide 
questions involving the Charter. The tribunal could also grant Charter 
remedies in relation to issues arising in the course of carrying out the 
tribunal’s statutory mandate.34 
The Court also stated that the “effect of Conway is that an adminis-
trative tribunal with the authority to apply s. 52 of the Constitution Act, 
1982 will also have the authority to grant remedies under s. 24(1) of the 
Charter. The only limit to this power is if the remedy sought is not the 
kind of remedy that the Legislature intended the tribunal to grant.”35 
                                                                                                             
32  [2011] O.J. No. 192, 2011 ONSC 323 (Ont. Div. Ct.) [hereinafter “Sazant”].  
33  Schedule 2 to the Regulated Health Prodessions Act, 1991, S.C. 1991, c. 18. 
34  Sazant, supra, note 32, at para. 182. 
35  Id., at para. 184.  
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The Court found that the Committee’s empowering statute granted it 
the power and duty to decide questions of law, while nothing in the 
statute removed the Committee’s jurisdiction to decide constitutional 
issues. As a result, the Committee had jurisdiction to determine Charter 
issues. The statute in this case also explicitly granted the Committee 
jurisdiction to grant the remedy sought by the appellant under s. 24(1).36 
Similarly, in ORDER MO-2570; Port Hope (Municipality),37 the On-
tario Information and Privacy Commission (“IPC”) held that it had 
jurisdiction to make a determination on the constitutional arguments. A 
community association appealed a decision of the Municipality of Port 
Hope regarding records relating to the Commissioners of the Port Hope 
Harbour (the “Harbour Commission”). The Privacy Commissioner cited 
Conway for the purpose of demonstrating that administrative tribunals 
have the power to decide questions of law and resolve constitutional 
questions where constitutional jurisdiction has not been clearly with-
drawn.38 The Privacy Commissioner found that the Municipal Freedom 
of Information and Protection of Privacy Act39 (“the Act”) made it 
“abundantly clear that the Commissioner has the power to decide 
questions of law on a wide range of subjects, triggering the constitutional 
authority referred to in the Martin and Conway cases”.40 Furthermore, 
there was no provision in the Act that withdrew the Commissioner’s 
power to decide constitutional questions. The IPC found that it therefore 
had jurisdiction to make a determination on the constitutional arguments 
raised by the Harbour Commission. 
(b) Section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 
Conway is also part of a broader trend at the Supreme Court that ex-
pands the powers of administrative tribunals to consider constitutional 
issues. This is illustrated in Rio Tinto Alcan Inc. v. Carrier Sekani Tribal 
Council.41 In that case, the Supreme Court extended the test developed in 
Conway to constitutional issues more generally to hold that a commission 
                                                                                                             
36  Id., at para. 185. 
37  [2010] O.I.P.C. No. 157 (Ontario Information and Privacy Commissioner) [hereinafter 
“Port Hope”].  
38  Id., at para. 12. 
39  R.S.O 1990, c. M.56. 
40  Port Hope, supra, note 37, at para. 17. 
41  [2010] S.C.J. No. 43, [2010] 2 S.C.R. 650 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Rio Tinto”]. 
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had the power to consider whether the duty to consult under section 35 of 
the Constitution Act, 1982 had been met.  
The issue in Rio Tinto was whether the British Columbia Utilities 
Commission (the “Commission”) was required to consider consultation 
with the Carrier Sekani Tribal Council First Nations to determine 
whether a contract for the sale of excess power was in the public interest. 
According to the Court, issues of consultation between the Crown and 
Aboriginal groups arose from section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982, 
making the question of whether the Commission possessed the power to 
consider consultation a constitutional issue.42 The Court found that the 
Utilities Commission Act43 gave the Commission power to decide 
questions of law, which implied a power to decide constitutional issues 
properly before it, “absent a clear demonstration that the legislature 
intended to exclude such jurisdiction from the tribunal’s power”.44 
Although the Utilities Commission Act incorporated a section of the 
Administrative Tribunals Act45 stating that a tribunal did not have 
jurisdiction over constitutional matters, the definition of “constitutional 
question” in the Administrative Tribunals Act was limited to only 
requiring notice for challenges to the constitutional validity or applicabil-
ity of any law.46  
The Court held that consultation issues did not fall within this defini-
tion and that there did not appear to be a clear intention on the part of the 
legislature to exclude from the Commission’s jurisdiction the duty to 
consider whether the Crown had discharged its duty to consult. The 
consultation issues were not a challenge to the constitutional validity of a 
law, nor a claim for a constitutional remedy.47 The Court concluded that 
the Commission had the power to consider whether adequate consulta-
tion with concerned Aboriginal peoples had taken place. 
However, the Court did place limits on the Commission’s jurisdic-
tion. Chief Justice McLachlin, writing for the Court, held that the 
language of the Utilities Commission Act did not extend to empowering 
the Commission to engage in consultation in order to discharge the 
Crown’s constitutional obligation to consult.48  
                                                                                                             
42  Id., at para. 68. 
43  R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 473. 
44  Rio Tinto, supra, note 41, at para. 69. 
45  S.B.C. 2004, c. 45. 
46  Rio Tinto, supra, note 41, at para. 71. 
47  Id., at para. 72. 
48  Id., at para. 74.  
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2. Limits on the Jurisdiction of Administrative Tribunals 
Although the general trend is that administrative tribunals should 
consider constitutional and administrative questions where appropriate, it 
is important to keep in mind that they remain inferior tribunals without 
the authority to grant general declarations of constitutional validity. This 
is illustrated by Alberta (Attorney General) v. United Food and Commer-
cial Workers Union, Local No. 401,49 a recent case from Alberta.  
During a labour dispute, the Alberta Labour Relations Board 
(“ALRB”) had declared that the absence of a minimum union security 
provision, such as a Rand provision, from the Labour Relations Code50 
was a violation of section 2(d) of the Charter that could “only be reme-
died by government action”. The ALRB suspended the declaration for a 
period of 12 months to allow the government to address the repercus-
sions of this decision.51 The Attorney General of Alberta sought a judicial 
review of the decision.  
In United Food the parties did not dispute that the ALRB had the 
jurisdiction to decide questions of law or that it was a court of competent 
jurisdiction in relation to the Charter. The parties also agreed that the 
ALRB could fashion appropriate Charter remedies affecting the parties 
before it. The issue was whether “as a matter of jurisdiction, an inferior 
tribunal … [could] determine the constitutional validity of a law for any 
purpose beyond the particular case and parties before it.”52  
The Court reviewed case law prior to Conway relating to declara-
tions of invalidity and found that appellate jurisprudence repeatedly held 
that inferior tribunals do not have the jurisdiction to grant general 
declarations of invalidity (Martin, Cuddy Chicks trilogy).53 The Court 
noted that in Conway, the Supreme Court had not overruled these cases. 
As a result, declarations of this sort could only relate to the matter 
directly before the tribunal and could bind the parties “only for purposes 
of that matter”.54 The Court ruled that the ALRB therefore did not have 
the jurisdiction to issue a general declaration of invalidity. 
                                                                                                             
49  [2010] A.J. No. 1417, at para. 9 (Alta. Q.B.) [hereinafter “United Food”]. 
50  R.S.A. 2000, c. L-1. 
51  United Food, supra, note 49, at para. 9. 
52  Id., at para. 12.  
53  Id., at paras. 31-40. 
54  Id., at para. 49.  
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3. Conway and the Ontario Review Board 
In light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Conway that the ORB can 
only order a remedy that is available to it under statute, it is interesting to 
consider the types of remedies the ORB will craft in response to Charter 
violations. The recent decision in Saikaley55 is illustrative. 
The accused, Mr. Saikaley, was under a detention order but had been 
living in the community. Due to a deterioration in his mental condition 
he was brought back to the hospital. On the third day of Mr. Saikaley’s 
detention in the hospital, it was anticipated that his detention would be 
longer than seven days and thus the hospital notified the ORB that the 
accused had been returned to the hospital. Normally, the ORB is charged 
with holding a restriction of liberties hearing whenever an accused is 
detained in hospital for a period of longer than seven days pursuant to 
section 672.81 of the Criminal Code. However, there was a delay in 
convening a restriction of liberty hearing. As a result, although the 
patient was brought back to the hospital at the end of August, the hearing 
was not convened until December. Mr. Saikaley argued that the delay in 
holding a hearing constituted an infringement of his sections 7 and 9 
rights under the Charter. The remedy that Mr. Saikaley sought was an 
order directing the hospital to implement an improved protocol to 
effectively notify the ORB that a patient’s liberties had been restricted 
and that a restriction of liberties hearing would have to be convened as 
soon as practicable. One of the reasons for the delay in scheduling the 
restriction of liberties hearing was that from the ORB’s perspective it 
was not clear when the hospital notified the ORB on the third day of the 
patient’s detention, that the detention would persist for longer than seven 
days and that therefore a restriction of liberties hearing would need to be 
convened.  
The ORB held that the hospital’s decision to restrict the liberty of the 
accused was initially warranted. However, the restriction persisted in a 
fashion that was no longer consistent with the least onerous and least 
restrictive requirement. The ORB held that the accused’s right to liberty 
and security of the person as guaranteed by section 7 of the Charter was 
infringed due to the delay in holding a restriction of liberty hearing in a 
more timely manner. In its Decision and Disposition, the ORB granted 
the following remedies: 
                                                                                                             
55  Re Saikaley, [2011] O.R.B.D. No. 677 (O.R.B.) [hereinafter “Saikaley”]. 
470 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2011), 54 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
 That in order to ensure that the Board receives timely and adequate 
notice of any significant restriction of an NCR accused’s liberty in 
excess of seven days (as required by s. 672.56(2) of the Criminal 
Code), the Board finds that once the liberty of an NCR or unfit accused 
has been significantly restricted by the Hospital for in excess of seven 
days, the Hospital must thereafter inform the Board, in writing and as 
soon as is practicable, of the details of such restriction. 
 That upon receiving written notice that the liberty of an NCR or 
unfit accused has been significantly restarted for in excess of seven 
days, the Review Board will hold a hearing pursuant to s. 672.81(2.1) 
as soon as practicable, and generally within no more than 30 days, to 
review the decision to significantly increase the restrictions on the 
accused’s liberty. 
In its Reasons for Disposition, the ORB noted that “there is little 
precedent on the question of Charter remedies in the context of Review 
Board hearings.”56 However, the ORB looked to analogous situations that 
could provide guidance such as Nordheimer J.’s decision in R. v. 
Brown,57 in which Nordheimer J. had to consider the appropriate remedy 
when more than 100 individuals were arrested but not taken before a 
justice of the peace within 24 hours. Justice Nordheimer held that despite 
the infringement of the liberty interests of the accused, he must balance 
their interest with that of the other citizens of the community and their 
safety. Implicitly, Nordheimer J. balanced the infringement to the 
accused’s liberty interest with that of the public’s interest in safety, and 
he was not prepared to order a remedy that released the accused into the 
community. Similarly, the ORB acknowledged that the inordinate delay 
in holding a restriction of liberties hearing process infringed Mr. Sai-
kaley’s Charter rights, but it was not prepared to grant his release as he 
continued to pose a significant risk to the safety of the public.  
The remedy that the ORB ordered to remedy the infringement of  
Mr. Saikaley’s Charter rights was to clarify the process for both the 
hospital and the ORB in scheduling restriction of liberties hearings. The 
ORB also provided an interpretation to the term “as soon as practicable” 
by giving a time limit of 30 days.  
The decision in Saikaley confirms the constraints that Conway sug-
gested on the jurisdiction of tribunals to order Charter remedies, namely, 
that the tribunal is confined to the remedies available under its statutory 
                                                                                                             
56  Id., at para. 24. 
57  [2007] O.J. No. 2830 (Ont. S.C.J.). 
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framework. In the case of Saikaley, the ORB ordered the hospital to 
develop a plan to safely release the accused into the community within 
60 days of the order, recognizing its obligation under its statutory 
framework to fashion dispositions that facilitate the reintegration of the 
accused into the community, while mitigating any risks of that release to 
public safety. The ORB also laid out a policy for future cases, requiring 
restriction of liberty hearings to take place within 30 days of the ORB’s 
receipt of notice that such a hearing is required.  
VI.  CONCLUSION 
As we noted at the outset, Conway has been a positive development 
in administrative law. The Supreme Court took disparate case law and 
developed a simpler and more coherent test for when an administrative 
tribunal is a court of competent jurisdiction. The application of Conway 
by the lower courts and tribunals demonstrates that the primary consid-
eration is whether a tribunal has the jurisdiction to consider questions of 
law. As important, the recognition of a broad jurisdiction to consider 
Charter issues within administrative tribunals can be seen as an affirma-
tion of the important role that administrative decision-making plays in 
the administration of justice.  
 
 
